Mandatory disclosure and asymmetry in financial reporting  by Bertomeu, Jeremy & Magee, Robert P.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Accounting and Economics
Journal of Accounting and Economics 59 (2015) 284–299http://d
0165-41
(http://c
☆ Cur
n Corr
E-mjournal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jaeMandatory disclosure and asymmetry in financial reporting$
Jeremy Bertomeu a, Robert P. Magee b,n
a Ross Department of Accountancy at Baruch College, City University of New York, 55 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10010, United States
b Department of Accounting Information and Management at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan
Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2002, United Statesa r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 14 October 2011
Received in revised form
22 July 2014
Accepted 1 August 2014
Available online 18 September 2014
JEL classification:
M41
M48
Keywords:
Political
Certification
Financial accounting
Mandatory
Policyx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.08.007
01/& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevi
reativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/)
rent version: July 6, 2014.
esponding author. Tel.:þ1 847 491 2676.
ail addresses: jeremy.bertomeu@baruch.cunya b s t r a c t
This paper examines the demand for disclosure rules by informed managers interested in
increasing the market price of their firms. Within a model of political influence, a majority
of managers chooses disclosure rules with which all firms must comply. In equilibrium,
disclosure rules are asymmetric with greater levels of disclosure over adverse events.
This asymmetry is positively associated with the informativeness of the measurement and
increasing in the level of verifiability and ex-ante uncertainty of the information. The
theory also offers implications about the relation between mandatory and voluntary
disclosure, when both channels are endogenous.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).This study develops a rationale for the existence of asymmetric financial reporting rules mandating disclosures of
unfavorable economic events. This characteristic is shared by a broad set of accounting rules, generally referred to as
impairment accounting; impairments are an archetype for many existing measurement rules as illustrated by impairment
tests, lower of cost or market or contingent liabilities. Moreover, beyond pure impairment accounting, the asymmetric
reporting of bad news is a key institutional fact that permeates the very foundations of financial reporting, from the going-
concern opinion issued by an external auditor to the stricter enforcement by courts of law over material omissions of
adverse events.
Recent literature has provided a categorization of decision problems for which asymmetry is or is not optimal for
decision-making, but no definitive explanation for its ubiquity in financial reporting policy. Skeptics argue that there is no
universal solution to all decision-theoretic information design problems, as perhaps best summarized by Demski's (1973)
impossibility theorem. Here, we take a different path from that of the decision-theoretic approach. Rather than asking what
measurement best solves any individual production or contracting problem, we assume that observed policies respond to
the collective demands of managers and examine which disclosure rules emerge from a process of political compromise. In a
parsimonious model, we demonstrate that collective choice can lead to disclosure rules that are generally asymmetric ander B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
.
.edu (J. Bertomeu), r-magee@kellogg.northwestern.edu (R.P. Magee).
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decision-making purposes.
We develop a baseline model which includes as few elements as necessary and then expand this baseline to include
several additional institutional facts. In the baseline model, the economy is composed of managers privately informed about
future cash flows and selling shares of their firm in a competitive market. We assume that managers' behavior is motivated
by the short-term market price, that managers are the only interest group exerting influence to push for certain disclosure
rules, and that firms' shareholders (or other parties) do not exert influence. Each manager is endowed with one unit of
influence – hereafter, one vote – and the disclosure rule that is implemented reflects the preferences of the majority of
managers. We assume that all firms must disclose in accordance to what was agreed to in the vote. We therefore refer to
these disclosures as mandatory – and any minority of managers that did not support the rule, or might lose from it, cannot
opt out or ignore the rule. Implementing disclosure rules entails a cost incurred by all firms.
Then, we extend the baseline model to incorporate other important characteristics of the environment. We consider the
determination of disclosure rules when managers can voluntarily provide additional information. The asymmetry of
mandatory disclosure rules extends to this environment but we show that voluntary disclosure tends to substitute for
mandatory disclosure. Contrary to most voluntary disclosure models, non-disclosure can lead to a positive market reaction
because bad news is subject to mandatory disclosure. We also consider a setting where an “outside party” (e.g., investors,
a standard-setter, uninformed managers, managers with a long-term horizon, etc.) can offset some of the influence exerted
by informed managers. The asymmetry extends to this setting, and we show that influence by an outside party weakly
reduces disclosure. In addition, the baseline results are robust to variations in the assumptions, such as settings in which
managers are imperfectly informed about future transactions affected by the rule or in which real operating decisions are
made conditional on the disclosure.
Our assumptions comport with a few stylized facts of the rule-setting process in accounting. First, in the US, the
authority to enact a new accounting standard lies with Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Furthermore,
Congress often takes an active role in shaping accounting policy; during the period 1976–2000, for example, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board was involved in eighteen Congressional hearings (Beresford, 2001). Second, Congress is a
political body, subject to various influences and pressures by interest groups. Managers of reporting firms form an important
example of such an interest group and may represent the point of view of their current shareholders. For example, Beresford
(1988) notes that, “for most of our projects, the preparer community tends to be the most vocal in expressing opinions about the
various issues” (p. 5) and Zeff (2002) similarly remarks that “preparers in the U.S. are well-organized and constitute a powerful
lobby” (p. 44). Third, final standards emerge from a process of political compromise, which may not benefit unorganized
interest groups or groups whose interest lies in the minority. Implementing disclosure rules is mandatory for all publicly
traded firms, and a public firm cannot opt out and write its own rules even if doing so is in the best interest of its
shareholders. There are open questions as to whether this is the best format for a standard-setting institution (Dye and
Sunder, 2001; Bertomeu and Cheynel, 2013) which we cannot answer here.
We emphasize that this paper does not intend to offer a general theory of standard-setting and note several caveats. We
focus the model on the market price impact of a new rule. This has the benefit of focusing the model on trade-offs discussed
in the extensive disclosure literature, but also comes with the limitations inherent to this family of models. In particular, we
cannot discuss issues that pertain to stewardship problems as, for example, in the case of standards about compensation
measurement or regulatory capital ratios. In addition, the model focuses on influence by parties interested in increasing the
short-term stock price. We do not offer here a game-theoretic model in which a standard-setter plays a political game to stir
political forces toward a preferred outcome (see Amershi et al., 1982 and Bertomeu and Cheynel, 2013 for models of active
standard-setting). Hence, our baseline model does not predict the relatively recent trend toward fair-value accounting.1
We provide next a sketch of the formal intuition and develop the complete argument in subsequent sections. Firms'
outcomes are drawn from a known distribution, and a disclosure rule defines the outcomes that must be made public. A
Condorcet equilibrium disclosure rule is defined such that no majority of firms' managers would be willing to change that
rule to a proposed alternative. Consider an existing policy enforcing disclosures of some favorable events but not of other
less favorable events. There is, in such a policy, a mass of non-disclosers who support any new policy that increases the non-
disclosure market price. Such a new policy can be designed as follows: reclassify a small fraction of favorable events
“disclosed” in the existing policy as “not-disclosed” in the new policy. Because these events are favorable, the reclassification
will increase the non-disclosure market price and, therefore, it will be supported by all non-disclosers in the old policy. The
fact that only a small fraction of events is reclassified is key in this construction of a new policy: managers whose events
have been reclassified might oppose the new policy but, because only few of them have been reclassified, they do not have
the votes to overcome the preference of all non-disclosers.
An equilibrium policy, when it exists, must then require disclosure of relatively unfavorable economic events. In fact, we
show that the equilibrium rule maximizes the non-disclosure market price and, in the complete analysis, further show that1 Yet, our model does allow researchers to understand why, overall, managers may oppose fair-value accounting. (This opposition is particularly
prominent in the comment letters submitted by the banking industry, where fair-value is most widely applied). It is also the case that, in both US GAAP and
international standards, fair-value measurements are often optional (for many classes of non-financial tangible assets) or explicitly forbidden (for most
current assets and intangibles) and do not constitute the largest portion of balance sheets, even for primarily financial firms (Laux and Leuz, 2010).
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is always associated with more disclosure of unfavorable events.
The objective of our model is to clarify some determinants of observed disclosure, and several implications emerge from
the analysis. First, we predict that the asymmetry in reporting is a prevalent characteristic when managers are informed
about the impact of a reporting change on their firm and exert political influence. Related to this prediction, several recent
studies document changes in the influence of managers on the standard-setting process (Allen, 2012; Charkravarthy, 2014).
Second, we predict that transactions that are easier to objectively verify or are characterized by greater levels of ex-ante
uncertainty (or greater impact on market prices) tend to feature more asymmetric rules and greater levels of disclosure.
A tangible asset's value may be observed in an external market while the future value of an internally generated intangible
(with no external acquisition price) is difficult to verify. Therefore, only the former will be asymmetrically measured.2 Third,
we predict that politically determined disclosure rules need not maximize the average market price. We show that such
rules are generally costly to the shareholders of firms with below-median events to report and who, in our model, tend to be
part of a political minority. We thus offer a framework that can explain who bears the costs associated with excessive
mandatory disclosure (Benston, 1973; Bushee and Leuz, 2005; Leuz et al., 2008).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents a review of related literature. The baseline model
and assumptions are presented in Section 2. For simplicity, the baseline model includes informed managers and a pure-
exchange economy. The equilibrium reporting policy and comparative statics are provided in Section 3. Section 4 adds
voluntary disclosure to the baseline model. Section 5 examines the robustness of our predictions in richer environments,
including influence exerted by an outside party, interim information and real investment decisions. Concluding remarks are
provided in Section 6, and proofs appear in the Appendix.1. Related literature
That financial market regulations might be explained as the endogenous outcome of social institutions is not a new idea.
The political aspect of security regulation traces its origins at least as far back as Stigler's theory of regulatory capture (e.g.,
Stigler, 1971). Stigler observed that many normative policy prescriptions do not seem to be descriptive of enacted policies as
we observe them. Over the years, this viewpoint has led to a large stream of empirical research discussing the consequences
of politically determined security regulations (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; Ramanna, 2008;
Kothari et al., 2010; Allen and Ramanna, 2013). According to this strand of literature, an understanding of observed policy-
making requires a description of not just the object of the policy, but also the institution that enacts new policy.
Only a small prior theoretical literature exists on endogenous accounting rule choice, of which we give a few examples
below. In a recent study, Bertomeu and Magee (2011) focus on the dependence of accounting quality on economy-wide
systematic movements. Also related to this study, Bertomeu and Cheynel (2013) and Bertomeu and Magee (2014) focus on
various strategic agenda-setting mechanisms when a Condorcet equilibrium does not exist and characterize endogenous
disclosure rule cycles driven by the agenda-setting process. Friedman and Heinle (2012) develop a model in which
management can expend resources to lobby against the implementation of socially desirable disclosure requirements. They
show that, compared to industry-specific regulation, one-size-fits-all regulations create a free-rider situation that reduces
the total amount of lobbying and – as a result – the social costs of such lobbying activities. This research also echoes recent
studies that investigate collective decision-making within firms through shareholder voting and the potential inefficiencies
that may result from such a process (Fischer, 2010).
Most of the prior work on mandatory disclosure in accounting has drawn from normative economic theory, i.e., welfare
consequences for various social objective functions. Normative theory offers critical insights concerning the desirability of
alternative policies and, within this literature, several prior studies have offered theories that explain the costs and benefits
of asymmetric measurement (Guay and Verrecchia, 2006; Gigler et al., 2009; Goex and Wagenhofer, 2009). More broadly,
this literature identifies conditions for the decision problem under consideration and the social objective function under
which regulators should enforce certain conservative practices. Our paradigm here is different. As in the regulatory capture
literature, we take self-interested influence activities as a given and examine their effect on observed policy; disclosure rules
that emerge in our model need not be socially efficient.32. The model
We develop here the assumptions of the baseline model starting with the timeline of events as described in Fig. 1.2 We view here the practice of fully expensing an intangible investment as an example of “no-disclosure” because no additional information is
provided about the value of that intangible asset beyond its historical cost.
3 We refer to Watts and Zimmerman (1979) for a thorough discussion of influence activities on accounting matters. Generally critical of the purely
normative approach, they note that “Government regulation creates a demand for normative accounting theories employing public interest arguments,
that is, for theories purporting to demonstrate that certain accounting procedures should be used because they lead to better decisions” (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1979, p. 283).
Fig. 1. Model timeline.
Table 1
Main notations.
Notation Definition Details
~x Expected future cash flow Privately observed.
Fð:Þ (resp. f ð:Þ) c.d.f. (resp. p.d.f.) of ~x Support over X ¼ ½x ; x:
m Median of ~x
set Δ Disclosure rule Events x in Δ are not disclosed.
κCðΔÞ Disclosure cost conditional on Δ CðΔÞ ¼Hð1Probð ~xAΔÞÞ, where κ40 and H0ð:Þ40.
P(x) Price when disclosing x In baseline: PðxÞ ¼ x.
PðΔÞ Price when not disclosing In baseline: PðΔÞ ¼ Eð ~xj ~xAΔÞ.
γðyÞ Voluntary disclosure threshold, Section 4 only Conditional on Δ¼ ðy; xÞ and cvol.
cvol Voluntary disclosure cost, Section 4 only
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an i.i.d. signal ~x, drawn from a continuous distribution with p.d.f. f ð:Þ, c.d.f. Fð:Þ and support X ¼ ½x; xDR. The mean of the
distribution is finite with a median denoted m. As in most disclosure models, the signal need not equal actual cash flows,
and one may interpret ~x as a posterior expectation about future cash flows after some information is received or
a transaction observed. The model's main notations are summarized in Table 1.
As in the prior disclosure literature (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985), managers sell shares of the firm in a competitive
market and prefer higher market prices. This model is usually interpreted as a reduced-form for a multi-period setting, in
which an old generation must sell their shares to a new generation (Dye, 1988; Gao, 2010). Each manager has one unit of
influence (a “vote”) that can be used to affect disclosure requirements. For expositional purposes, we assume that the firm's
other shareholders do not vote, so that managers are delegated the ability to decide on disclosure rules. Managers in our
model use their influence to increase the market price available to other shareholders in their firm and thus act according to
the best interest of their current shareholders. Also, as in the prior literature, we assume that long-term shareholders (not
selling equity) cannot prevent managers from pushing for disclosure rules that increase short-term stock prices and that
a manager's vote cannot be observed by the market.
A rule is described by a set of realizations of the underlying information ~x that must be disclosed. We assume that firms
must disclose in accordance to the rule determined by the voting process, so we refer to these disclosures as mandatory. A
manager cannot choose not to disclose if she did not support the rule or if implementing the rule is not in the best interest
of her firm's shareholders.4
A1. A disclosure rule is defined as a “non-disclosure” set Δ, which we restrict to be empty or a finite union of open intervals,
such that the firm must disclose when x=2Δ.
In the formal analysis, we describe the set of events that are not disclosed as a subset ΔDX of all possible events. To be
concrete, consider the following example. An innovation makes it possible to fair value subsidiaries within a firm on an
ongoing basis. This innovation allows the possibility of (a) requiring all previous acquisitions to be reported at fair value (i.e.,
Δ¼∅), (b) requiring fair value only if it falls below a threshold y (i.e., Δ¼ ðy; xÞ) or (c) retaining valuations at pure historical
cost, which provides no new disclosure (i.e., Δ¼ ðx; xÞ). Managers may be in various types of firms, including firms with
underwater acquisitions or acquisitions whose value has increased. As we show later on, a rule similar to lower-of-cost-or-
market emerges in our setting.
There is a verification cost paid by each firm to enforce a particular disclosure rule. This cost can reflect the cost of an
audit or, more generally, the cost involved in meeting reporting requirements, gathering and distributing supplementary
information or giving access to proprietary information to outside parties. The verification cost increases with the precision
of the rule in place; i.e., the disclosure cost per firm decreases as the non-disclosure set increases, but it does not depend on
whether a disclosure is made. This is formally stated next.4 In practice, firms have costly alternatives to avoid certain rules, which may include the legal remedy of delisting and/or changing the number of
investors, a move to a different constituency, or committing illegal acts by violating a reporting rule. However, a complete formal treatment of these
additional considerations goes far beyond our current study.
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probability of disclosure, Hð0Þ ¼ 0, H0ð:Þ40 and κ40 is a parameter.5
For simplicity, we develop the baseline argument in a pure-exchange environment with risk-neutral pricing. That is, real
decisions have been made in the past and are sunk by the time the disclosure rule is chosen. This assumption implies that
shareholders would be better-off with an ex-ante commitment (prior to observing x) not to require any mandatory
disclosure. However, as in many disclosure models, the baseline results extend more broadly to other market pricing
functions, e.g., given various possible post-disclosure real decisions, in which case the ex-ante preferred level of mandatory
disclosure would be interior.6
A3. Conditional on a disclosure, the gross market price (before disclosure costs) is equal to the present value of expected future
cash flows PðxÞ ¼ x. Conditional on a non-disclosure and a rule Δ, the gross market price (before disclosure costs) is given by
PðΔÞ ¼ Eð ~xj ~xAΔÞ.
We assume that the disclosure rule chosen by the voting process is binding on all firms and is perfectly enforced, so that
a manager required to disclose cannot strategically withhold information or manipulate her disclosure. As a caveat to our
analysis, this assumption leaves aside special issues pertaining to “shadow” standards where firms attaining a certain level
of performance can manipulate their report to meet a mandatory disclosure threshold and which are discussed at length in
Dye (2002).7
A4. Firms report truthfully when their information lies outside of the set Δ (i.e., managers cannot over-report). Firms have no
ability to withhold if their information lies outside of this set.
After public disclosures have taken place, shares are traded in a competitive market composed of risk-neutral buyers.
Shares are sold for a price PðΔÞκCðΔÞ if xAΔ and no disclosure is made, or PðxÞκCðΔÞ if x is disclosed. We assume that
disclosures are the only means through which information about future cash flows is conveyed.
The equilibrium concept used to solve the game is the Condorcet equilibrium, defined as a rule such that, for any
alternative, managers who strictly prefer the equilibrium outnumber managers who strictly prefer the alternative.
Definition 2.1. A disclosure rule Δn is a Condorcet equilibrium if, for any alternative rule Δ, the proportion of managers
strictly better off under Δn is greater than (or equal to) the proportion of managers strictly better off under the alternative.
When it exists, the Condorcet equilibrium is a solution for a class of majority voting games (e.g., Downs, 1957). In the
context of our model, the Condorcet equilibrium is used as a reduced form for an underlying political process that
aggregates the votes of firms' managers and establishes a disclosure rule to which all firms must adhere. A Condorcet
disclosure rule has political stability in the sense that any proposed alternative would be opposed by a majority of managers.
In the sections that follow, we analyze the nature of the equilibrium when these assumptions hold. However, before
doing so, we note several important caveats to these assumptions. We place the emphasis on influence by managers and
assume that managers are solely interested in increasing the current market price. As an inherent limitation, this approach
does not offer a model of all determinants of standard-setting, which might include influence by users of information or
auditors, or other determinants such as, for example, macroeconomic conditions, personal ideologies of standing regulators
and manager-specific incentive problems. Several of these questions and their implications are discussed in prior literature
in the area (Hochberg et al., 2009; Bertomeu and Magee, 2011; Allen and Ramanna, 2013). In addition, the equilibrium
concept does not intend to capture fine details about the decision process within an actual institution; as a result, the model
cannot speak about the strategy of an active standard-setter or how the standard-setting institution should be organized
(Dye and Sunder, 2001; Kothari et al., 2010; Bertomeu and Cheynel, 2013).3. The disclosure equilibrium
This section develops a formal characterization of an equilibrium disclosure rule. The equilibrium rule must be preferred
by a sufficiently large fraction of managers; therefore, to test whether a rule is an equilibrium, one must examine which
groups of managers would be willing to alter an existing disclosure requirement.
We begin the analysis with three lemmas that collectively describe conditions that the equilibrium rule must meet.
Although we allow for a disclosure set that takes the form of a union of disjoint intervals (e.g., events below a certain level
and above a certain level are not disclosed), an equilibrium must have a single interval of events not subject to mandatory
disclosure.
Lemma 3.1. In any equilibrium, Δ¼ ðy; zÞ is a single interval5 The proofs extend to a generalized version of A2 in which the cost is greater when a disclosure policy is more precise in the sense of Blackwell. In
addition, similar results hold if the cost is also a function of whether a disclosure has been made. A formal treatment of this scenario is available from the
authors on request.
6 In the voluntary disclosure models of Verrecchia (1983) and Dye (1985), the asymmetric disclosure of favorable events holds even with investment
decisions.
7 As we explain in more detail in Section 5.3, it does not seem likely that such additional forces would affect the main predictions provided we replace
the formal threshold by the shadow threshold after accounting for the manipulation.
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Fig. 2. Analysis of candidate non-disclosure sets. (a) Non-disclosure set is not an interval (lemma 3.1), (b) Favorable news is subject to disclosure (lemma
3.2) and (c) Some above-median events are disclosed (lemma 3.3).
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Suppose that the non-disclosure region were not an interval, e.g., a set that includes both relatively low-value firms and
relatively high-value firms while imposing disclosure for moderate-value firms. For example, the left-hand side of Fig. 2(a)
has two non-disclosure intervals N1 and N2 over ðy1; z1Þ and ðy2; z2Þ, respectively. From this disclosure rule, it would be
possible to reclassify a small fraction of low-value non-disclosing firms, say those between y1 and y1þϵ1, into disclosers and
a slightly greater fraction of moderate-value disclosing firms, between z1 and z1þϵ2, into non-disclosers to increase the non-
disclosure price, with ϵ1 and ϵ2 chosen to reduce disclosure costs for all firms. This change would strictly benefit the price of
all who remain non-disclosers (those between y1þϵ1 and z1 and those in N2) and hurt the market price of only a small
fraction of reclassified firms. All firms who continue to be disclosers would benefit from the reduction in disclosure costs.
This reclassification (depicted on the right-hand side of Fig. 2(a)) would be supported by a strict majority of managers. That
same analysis can be applied again to the right-hand side of Fig. 2(a), repeating it until the intermediate disclosure region
would be entirely removed and, thus, demonstrating that a non-disclosure set that is not a single interval cannot be an
equilibrium.
We show next that the non-disclosure region must be an interval that includes only favorable realizations of the
information ~x . We also demonstrate this claim with an argument by contradiction. In the left-hand side of Fig. 2(b), we
consider a rule in which favorable events ~x4z are disclosed. We then amend this rule by reclassifying some favorable
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expand the non-disclosure region from (y,z) to ðy; zþϵÞ where the events ðz; zþϵÞ have been reclassified. The amended rule
reduces the disclosure set and, therefore, decreases disclosure costs; hence, it is preferred by all managers who disclose
under both rules. In addition, the amended rule features more favorable expectations conditional on non-disclosure (since
only favorable types have been reclassified); hence, it is also preferred by all non-disclosers under both rules. Managers
whose event has been reclassified, shown as a dashed area in Fig. 2(b), may oppose the new rule. However, if the
reclassification is kept small (i.e., ϵ is small), these managers lack the voting power to resist incorporation into the non-
disclosure region. Therefore, the non-disclosure region N¼ ðy; zÞ depicted in the left-hand side of Fig. 2(b) cannot be an
equilibrium, and a sequence of such adjustments would move the upper limit of Δ to x.
Lemma 3.2. In any equilibrium, only unfavorable events are subject to a mandatory disclosure. That is, the non-disclosure region
has the form Δn ¼ ðyn; xÞ.8
To extend this logic further, equilibrium disclosure requirements cannot require disclosures from the majority of firms
since, as noted above, the majority would immediately push to reduce disclosure requirements. The left-hand side of Fig. 2(c)
has a single, upper-tail non-disclosure region inwhich all outcomes exceeding a threshold y are not subject to disclosure. But if
y is greater than the median of all managers' outcomes, then more than half of the voting managers are disclosing, and as
noted above, disclosers prefer reductions in disclosure requirements to lower costs. Therefore, moving the lower non-
disclosure limit from y to yϵ as in the right-hand side of Fig. 2(c) would obtain the support of all managers below yϵ, and
a sequence of such adjustments would continue until the disclosure threshold was below the median. Therefore, non-
disclosers must constitute the majority.
Lemma 3.3. If Δn is an equilibrium, then any xZm is such that xAΔn. That is, an equilibrium disclosure rule features non-
disclosure of (at least) all events that are above the median.
The type of asymmetric reporting requirement in Lemma 3.3 appears broadly consistent with the long-standing practice
of asset impairments, which generally require a special disclosure conditional on unfavorable events (Moonitz, 1951; Watts,
2002). Asset impairments are a principle common to various accounting rules in which an asset's loss of value must be
recognized immediately in the income statement (Goex andWagenhofer, 2009; Beyer, 2012) and there are, in practice, many
examples of applications of this principle, including goodwill impairments, inventory lower-of-cost-or-market valuation,
other-than-temporary impairment of securities available-for-sale, loss recognition in long-term contracts, accounting rules
for exchanges of assets that lack economic substance or advance recognition of reasonably certain liabilities, etc. To be
practical, a firm's manager may not know what all of its future impairments could be (and we do not assume that
information should be perfect) but might plausibly have private information, at any point in time, about possible
impairments on its current assets.9 It is this economic force that drives the demand for impairments in our model.
The argument developed up to this point implies that an equilibrium will have the threshold form Δn ¼ ðyn; xÞ, where yn
is the level below which events must be disclosed. The implication of this result is that all managers with x4yn achieve the
same market price (i.e., the non-disclosure market price) and, as a result, jointly support maximizing the non-disclosure
price. Furthermore, the threshold ynrm is below the median, so non-disclosers form a majority and can thus impose the
threshold that will maximize their payoff. Because their interests are perfectly aligned, non-disclosers “collude” to control
the rule-making process and pass disclosure rules that maximize the non-disclosure price, possibly against the interest of
other disclosing firms.
Proposition 3.1. If κ is sufficiently large, a unique equilibrium exists. In that equilibrium, all managers with xoyn disclose and
all others do not disclose, where yn is set to maximize the non-disclosure price PðΔÞκCðΔÞ where Δ¼ ðy; xÞ.10 If ynA ðx; xÞ is an
interior solution
Eð ~xj ~xZynÞyn ¼ κð1FðynÞÞH0ðFðynÞÞ ð1Þ
Otherwise, an equilibrium does not exist.
Corollary 3.1. Suppose that the non-disclosure price is concave in y with Eð ~xj ~xZmÞmZ :5κH0ð:5Þ (or, as a special case,
if disclosure is almost costless), then an equilibrium does not exist.
The equilibrium mandatory disclosure threshold, when it exists, has a simple characterization as the level that would
maximize the net non-disclosure price, as in the first-order condition in expression (1). Mandatory disclosure, when8 The lemma is partly reminiscent of a property of models of communication featuring cheap talk. In these models, the signal is voluntarily revealed by
an expert. The cheap talk setting often implies that coarser information is revealed for disclosures that, if they were believed, would be more favorable to
the sender (e.g., Fischer and Stocken, 2001; Marinovic, 2013).
9 We do not view the rules of impairments as rules that have been agreed upon in the past but, instead, as evolving rules that have been adjusted over
the years and, when unchanged or stable, are implicitly confirmed by the current interest of market participants (e.g., our framework assumes that if an old
rule were no longer in the best interest of the majority of affected parties, it would evolve and be adjusted). The process of dynamic convergence to a stable
set of rules is modeled in Bertomeu and Magee (2014).
10 In a generic problem, the function PðΔÞκCðΔÞ with Δ¼ ðy; xÞ has a unique global maximum in y. However, even if the problem is non-generic and
the global maximum is not unique, we show in the Appendix that the equilibrium remains unique and such that the smallest global maximum is selected.
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in sharp contrast with most of the extensive voluntary disclosure literature. Note also that, as is intuitive, there is less
mandatory disclosure when the information is more difficult (costly) to verify, so an increase in the cost κ implies a decrease
in the threshold below which events are disclosed and, therefore, in the probability that information is disclosed.
Another implication of this analysis is that there may be many circumstances in which an equilibrium disclosure standard
might not exist, generally if the costs of disclosure are low. For example, suppose that ~x is distributed uniformly between zero and
one and that the cost of disclosure is 3=4ðProbð ~x =2ΔÞÞ:2 The disclosure threshold satisfying expression (1) above occurs at
yn ¼ 1=3, and we refer to this as Alternative 1. All managers below 1/3 will disclose, and those above 1/3 will receive a gross
market price of 2/3. All managers incur a disclosure cost equal to 1/12 based on the probability of disclosure equal to 1/3. Now,
consider an Alternative 2 inwhich only those with x42=3 must disclose. Previous disclosers will favor Alternative 2 because they
now pool with those between 1/3 and 2/3 receive a gross market price 1/3 that is at least as large as their previous disclosure
price, and their cost of disclosure is unchanged. Those with x42=3 also prefer Alternative 2 because they now achieve a gross
market price of x that is greater than their prior gross market price of 2/3. Hence, a fraction of at least two-thirds prefers
Alternative 2 over Alternative 1, implying that Alternative 1 is not a Condorcet equilibrium. Of course, it is important to recognize
that Alternative 2 is not a Condorcet equilibrium. The reasoning for Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 shows that there are yet other
alternatives that would receive the support of a majority.11
This finding differs from those of prior voluntary disclosure literature, in which costless truthful reporting would unravel
to full-disclosure (see Beyer et al., 2010 for many references). Under these same conditions, striving to achieve some sort of
ongoing consensus among managers in a mandatory disclosure setting is fruitless. No matter what reporting policy is placed
on the agenda, there is an alternative policy that will be preferred by more than half of the managers – a situation in which a
standard-setter's recursive exposure draft/comment letter process might be prolonged. This property is not unique to our
setting and is common whenever the choice set is multi-dimensional (such as choosing which events to disclose). For
comparison, in the case of multi-dimensional spatial preferences (where agents have preferences that can be represented as
a geometric distance from a preferred option), an equilibrium generically does not exist (Plott, 1967). Indeed, it is the
existence of an equilibrium that is an unusual property of this particular disclosure environment given the many
nonexistence results shown in the economic literature.
Having shown why asymmetry may exist in the context of mandatory disclosure, we move next to a formal discussion of
the economic factors that may affect the asymmetry. We develop a comparative static that, under a restriction on the cost
function, holds for any distributional assumptions. Then, we examine several additional results in the special case of
normally distributed random variables. For these comparative statics to be non-trivial, we assume here that the solution of
Eq. (1) is unique and interior (i.e., the non-disclosure net market price has a single interior peak).
Corollary 3.2. Assume that the function ð1tÞ2H0ðtÞ is strictly increasing in t (i.e., the cost function is sufficiently convex).12 For
i¼1,2, let ~xi be distributed with c.d.f. Fið:Þ, median mi and equilibrium threshold yni . If ~x2 is a mean-preserving spread of ~x1
satisfying F1ðxÞoF2ðxÞ for any xomaxðm1;m2Þ, then the probability of disclosure under ~x2 is greater than the probability of
disclosure under ~x1.
The effect of a distributional change in the sense of a more risky distribution is typically ambiguous. A directional
prediction can be made, however, for certain kinds of mean-preserving spreads. That is, when changing the distribution by a
mean-preserving spread, i.e., a more risky ~x with the same mean, the probability of disclosure is greater under the riskier
distribution as long as the c.d.f.'s of the distributions do not cross before the median (e.g., if the extra risk is allocated in a
symmetric manner around the median).
Several stronger comparative statics can be obtained in the special case of a normally distributed random variable.
Corollary 3.3. Suppose that ~x Nðm;σ2Þ is normally distributed.(i)1
with
a Co
1
notThe probability of disclosure is decreasing in the cost κ, does not depend on the average cash flow m, and is increasing in the
uncertainty parameter σ2.(ii) The non-disclosure market price is increasing in the average cash flow m, is decreasing in the cost κ, and increasing in the
uncertainty parameter σ2.An increase in expected cash flows only shifts the threshold by an equal amount and does not affect the probability of
disclosure. An increase in ex-ante uncertainty increases the incremental informational content of the disclosure relative to
its cost and increases the probability of disclosure. These comparative statics are broadly in line with those previously1 In this example, consider Alternative 3 defined as a rule in which no manager discloses. In comparing Alternative 2 to Alternative 3, all managers
xo2=3 achieve a higher market price under Alternative 3 (a gross market price of .5 versus 1/3 under Alternative 2), implying that Alternative 2 is not
ndorcet equilibrium either.
2 Given that we use the differential characterization of the solution in Eq. (1), this convexity condition is required to guarantee that this equation does
have multiple interior solutions.
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and Kwon (1988), the effect of a change in the variance on the threshold yn is ambiguous.
4. Mandatory and voluntary disclosure
Most financial information is provided by issuers as part of mandatory filings for periodic reports (10-K, 10-Q), significant
events (8-K), etc.; however, firms also provide information in a voluntary manner, such as press releases or management
forecasts. The existence of both voluntary and mandatory disclosure poses a few fundamental questions that cannot be fully
answered by considering only one of those two forms of disclosure without the other: are there any differences between
what one would expect firms to disclose as part of mandatory requirements versus as part of voluntary disclosure channels?
How does the presence of voluntary disclosure as an alternative communication channel change politically determined
mandatory disclosure, and vice-versa, how should we expect such rules to affect voluntary disclosure? Finally, prior
literature has generally interpreted information that is not publicly released as potentially hiding bad information, but is this
still the case when mandatory disclosure is solved endogenously?
To incorporate voluntary disclosure into the model framework, we continue to assume that mandatory disclosures result
from a political process, but also allow a manager who is not required to disclose x to do so voluntarily for an incremental
cost cvol40. We continue to assume that all disclosures are truthful, whether mandatory or voluntary. The mandatory
disclosure cost κCðΔÞ is incurred by all firms to provide the information infrastructure for credible, truthful mandatory
disclosures and non-disclosures. This cost does not depend on whether a firm makes a disclosure, nor is it contingent on
what the disclosure might be. In addition to incremental reporting costs, cvol could reflect proprietary costs associated with
disclosure of a favorable outcome (competitor actions, higher property taxes) or possible costs arising from future
disclosures required to alert shareholders to forecast changes. Further discussion of these costs and their effects appears
after the principal results are presented and also in Section 5.3.
Rational investors must now form their price PðΔÞ after accounting for the fact that non-disclosers are managers with
~xAΔ that self-selected not to make a voluntary disclosure. Therefore, we now write PðΔÞ ¼ Eð ~xj ~xrγ; ~xAΔÞ where γ denotes
the voluntary disclosure threshold.13 Hereafter, given that the argument is identical to Lemma 3.1 in the baseline model, we
restrict the attention to Δ¼ ðy; zÞ being an interval.
We first argue that the asymmetry of mandatory disclosure is still present when voluntary disclosure is possible. To see
this, suppose that the mandatory non-disclosure region does not extend to the most favorable x outcomes. This type of rule
cannot be an equilibrium for the same reasons used in Lemma 3.2. Increasing the upper limit of the non-disclosure region
increases the non-disclosure market price PðΔÞ at least weakly and strictly decreases the cost of mandatory disclosure.
Therefore, all current non-disclosers and all continuing disclosers would prefer such an increase. This reasoning continues to
hold with voluntary disclosure: put differently, a rule that (potentially) permits managers with more favorable cash flows
not to disclose cannot decrease market expectations following a non-disclosure.
Having made this observation, for any candidate mandatory disclosure rule Δ¼ ðy; xÞ, the voluntary disclosure threshold
is a function γðyÞ where
γðyÞcvol ¼ Eð ~xj ~xAðy; γðyÞÞÞ ð2Þ
Eq. (2) is identical to the characterization in Verrecchia (1983) and states that the manager that lies exactly at the
threshold x¼ γðyÞ should be indifferent between disclosing and not disclosing.
Proposition 4.1. If Δnn ¼ ðynn; xÞ is an equilibrium, then either ynn ¼ x (no mandatory disclosure) or ynnAS where S¼
fy: FðγðyÞÞFðyÞZ :5g.
As in the baseline model, any equilibrium with some mandatory disclosure must have the non-disclosers comprising at
least half of all firms. In particular, as long as ynn4x and there is some mandatory disclosure, this condition implies that
FðynnÞo :5oFðγðynnÞÞ, and the median manager does not make a disclosure. In Fig. 3, mandatory disclosers are in region MD
below ynn, voluntary disclosers are in region VD above γðynnÞ, and those managers in region ND do not disclose. Managers in
MD and in VD prefer a reduction in the mandatory disclosure region (i.e., a lower value of y that decreases the cost of
mandatory disclosure). Therefore, a necessary condition for ynn to be an equilibrium mandatory disclosure threshold is that
the voluntary disclosers above γðynnÞ be a small enough subset that the non-disclosers in ND constitute more than half of the
population. For a given cost cvol, S in Proposition 4.1 is the set of mandatory disclosure thresholds y such that more than half
the managers fall between y and γðyÞ. If y is in set S, it is a candidate for the mandatory disclosure threshold ynn.
For any mandatory threshold y, the voluntary disclosure threshold depends on the cost cvol. If cvol is very small, most
managers with x4y would disclose voluntarily, making the set S empty. In an example such as Fig. 3, the values of ynn and
γðynnÞ might be too close together, and the non-disclosers in region ND might not have enough political weight to sustain a13 The disclosure price is increasing in the information disclosed, so the voluntary disclosure equilibrium will always take the form of a threshold γ,
above which managers disclose their information. The threshold γ is defined by (i) γcvol ¼ Eð ~xj ~xrγ; ~xAΔÞ or (ii) γ ¼ sup Δ if
sup ΔcvolrEð ~xj ~xr sup Δ; ~xAΔÞ. This threshold is always unique if Fð:Þ is logconcave, and even if it is not unique, the results carry over provided one
chooses the Pareto-dominant equilibrium (this can be easily shown to be the maximal feasible equilibrium voluntary disclosure threshold).
Fig. 3. Equilibrium with voluntary disclosure.
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equal all values below the median, as in the baseline model.
In what follows, assume that the function FðγðyÞÞFðyÞ does not have a tangency point at :5. This regularity condition is
not critical for the result but simplifies the exposition of the equilibrium.14 The next proposition offers a characterization of
the equilibrium with both mandatory and voluntary disclosure.
Proposition 4.2. Define c as the maximum cost of a voluntary disclosure such that S¼ fy: FðγðyÞÞFðyÞZ :5g is empty. Then, the
following holds:(i)1
at thIf cvoloc, non-disclosers cannot support a mandatory disclosure region, and the equilibrium must be given by Δnn ¼ ðx; xÞ.
Firms with x4γðxÞ make voluntary disclosures and all disclosures are voluntary.(ii) If cvolZc, the mandatory disclosure equilibrium must be given by Δnn ¼ ðynn; xÞ where ynn ¼ argmaxyA SEð ~xj ~xA
½y; γðyÞÞκCððy; xÞÞ. Managers with x4γðynnÞ make voluntary disclosures.Proposition 4.2 characterizes the solution of the model when mandatory and voluntary disclosure might coexist. The
nature of the equilibrium depends strongly on the costs of mandatory and voluntary disclosure. One may conjecture that the
voluntary disclosure cost cvol is likely to be larger than κCðΔÞ because disclosing that x is in an interval is less precise than
disclosing the exact value of x. As we mainly use that favorable news are disclosed voluntarily, the analysis could
accommodate settings in which the voluntary disclosure cost is a function of mandatory disclosure levels or which news is
voluntarily disclosed (see Section 5.3 below).
However, if voluntary disclosure is credible and relatively cheap, voluntary disclosers have enough political weight to
prevent any effort to require mandatory disclosure, regardless of the value of κCðΔÞ. In fact, the equilibrium features no
mandatory disclosure even before reaching cvol ¼ 0 so that, effectively, a relatively cheap voluntary disclosure channel can
work to reduce information about the most unfavorable events whose disclosure would have been mandatory in the
absence of voluntary disclosure.
From a more conceptual standpoint, case (i) offers a rationale to explain why certain events are disclosed solely through
voluntary channels and are not the object of mandatory disclosure; indeed, in this model, any use of mandatory disclosure
supposes a sufficient breakdown of the voluntary disclosure channel. In a general model, it is difficult to be precise about the
meaning of “relatively cheap” voluntary disclosure, but one indication would be if – in the absence of a mandatory
disclosure requirement – more than 50% of firms make a voluntary disclosure. Over the period 1994–2007, Beyer et al.
(2010) find that only 29% of their sample firms make at least one voluntary management earnings forecast, significantly
lower than that 50% level. Therefore, one could conjecture that cases in which voluntary disclosure would drive out
mandatory disclosure are rare.
Case (ii) features an environment in which there is mandatory disclosure over unfavorable events (below ynn) and
voluntary disclosure over favorable events (above γðynnÞ), as depicted in Fig. 3. Unlike in the baseline, some managers in the
region VD disclose voluntarily. The optimal mandatory disclosure threshold ynn in this environment takes into account these
voluntary disclosures when maximizing the non-disclosure price. If both κCðΔÞ and cvol are affected by the difficulty of
collecting, processing, reporting and verifying the disclosures, then we might expect them both to be “high” or both “low.” If
they are both high, then the MD and VD regions will be relatively small, and most firms will make no disclosure. As these
costs decrease, the ND region shrinks, but must still consist of at least half of all firms.
While the primary observations made in the baseline model carry over to this setting, case (ii) also offers a novel insight.
A non-disclosure corresponds to intermediate events, i.e., events that are neither subject to mandatory disclosure nor
disclosed voluntarily. Therefore, non-disclosure does not necessarily indicate unfavorable information. This result is of4 Specifically, whenever dðyÞ  FðγðyÞÞFðyÞ ¼ :5, then d0ðyÞa0. If this regularity condition is not satisfied, there could be multiple candidate equilibria
e tangency points.
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case of earnings quality). Contrary to models in which all disclosures are viewed as voluntary, a non-disclosure will be
favorably received if the cost of a voluntary disclosure is moderate or high.
5. Additional considerations
5.1. Voting by other parties
To this point, we have focused on a decision process in which only informed managers vote. In practice, however, other
parties exert influence on the rule-making process. As an example, regulators may have personal ideologies about what
constitutes better disclosure rules. In recent studies, Allen and Ramanna (2013) and Charkravarthy (2014) document support
by FASB members toward the Asset and Liability model, often in opposition to the preferences of other constituencies.
Investors have had a growing role in standard-setting, as illustrated by the definition of capital providers as primary users in
current conceptual statements and their growing representation among trustees and board members. Some managers may
represent the long-term interests of their shareholders, rather than focusing on short-term stock price. Finally, other groups
such as financial auditors have had an important influence on the rule-making process.
To discuss the effect of influence by other parties, we extend the model to a setting in which an outside party holds a
fraction α of all votes and the total influence of informed managers is reduced proportionately to 1α. The reader may
interpret this other party as any of the groups described in the previous paragraph but, for expositional purposes, we
hereafter use the term “the outside party.”
We assume that the outside party has a continuous single-peaked preference Uðy; zÞ for any rule Δ¼ ðy; zÞ with a unique
preferred rule Δs ¼ ðys; zsÞ. To make this problem non-trivial, assume also that Δs does not coincide with the level described
in Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 5.1. Δs ¼ ðys; zsÞ is an equilibrium if αZ :5. Suppose next that αo :5 and denote y0 ¼ argmaxUðy; xÞ and yn as the
threshold if there is no outside party (as given in Proposition 3.1). Then,(i) If y04yn or ð1αÞð1FðynÞÞZ :5, the equilibrium rule Δns ¼ ðyn; xÞ is not a function of α and does not reflect the preference of
the outside party.(ii) Otherwise, the equilibrium rule Δns ¼ ðyns ; xÞ is such that (a) if ð1αÞð1Fðy0ÞÞ4 :5, yns ¼ F 1ðð:5αÞ=ð1αÞÞ and (b) if
ð1αÞð1Fðy0ÞÞr :5, yns ¼ y0.Proposition 5.1 establishes that there are limits to what partially empowering the outside party might achieve. As
expected, the outside party can implement his preferred rule when he has complete authority (e.g., αZ :5) to set the
disclosure rule regardless of the preferences of the reporting managers. More surprisingly, we find that if the outside party
does not have complete authority, then he cannot implement any rule that features disclosure over certain favorable events,
i.e., with zox. For instance, suppose the outside party prefers disclosure if x is greater than a given threshold z. By the
reasoning used in Lemma 3.2, almost all informed managers would vote for a small increase in z, so the outside party's
preference cannot be an equilibrium as long as 1α4 :5.
Moreover, there are situations in which the outside party's influence has no effect on the equilibrium, as featured in case
(i). In this scenario, the outside party prefers more disclosure than the level preferred by managers, a situation that seems
descriptive of the preferences of current standard-setting bodies. Then, the implemented rule does not depend on α and
remains at the level chosen by the non-disclosers. In case (ii), which occurs when the outside party prefers less disclosure
than reporting managers, an increase in the outside party's influence α shifts the equilibrium disclosure rule toward the
level preferred by the outside party. Yet, even if the outside party does not inherently support an asymmetric rule, we show
that the equilibrium rule will remain asymmetric.
As an example, there could be a fraction αo :5 of managers who are completely uninformed about ~x when they vote, or
alternatively, who care about the long-term stock price rather than the short-term stock price. In this pure exchange setting,
these managers would prefer no disclosure, so we could set Δs ¼ X. As an example of case (ii) (a) of Proposition 5.1,
the mandatory disclosure threshold will be set at F 1ðð:5αÞ=ð1αÞÞ. As α approaches 0.5, the threshold approaches x.
This implies that the probability of disclosure will be positive, but will decrease as more managers become uninformed or
focused on long-term price.
5.2. Interim information
In the baseline model, a manager receives a signal about future cash flows ~x and can perfectly predict, conditional on an
implemented policy Δ, whether the signal will or will not be disclosed. It is not critical if the manager's signal is imperfect,
but it is important that the manager be able to forecast the accounting implications of a new disclosure rule on her report
(because, in the limit, if a manager had no information, she would prefer no disclosure in a pure-exchange setting).
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be disclosed. For example, to decide whether to support a new rule about the valuation of past acquisitions, a manager
might know that past acquisitions are not currently impaired, but might become impaired at some date in the future when
the rule is implemented. More generally, uncertainty may prevent a manager from knowing exactly whether a future
transaction will be subject to a disclosure requirement.
Assume that, prior to Δ being selected, the manager knows a partitional signal w, which is an element of a partition
A¼ fAig of X composed only of connected sets (i.e., points or intervals).15 That is, if xAAiAA, the manager observes w¼ Ai
but does not know the actual realization of x. For instance, the manager may only know in which quantile the firm's x lies. In
addition, to avoid a simple solution of the problem in which a single group of managers has enough votes to dictate a rule,
we assume that the probability of each Ai is strictly less than 50%.
In this context, Assumptions A1–A3 are maintained, and after the selection of Δ, each manager's true x is realized and
must be disclosed if it does not fall in Δ. It should be noted that managers no longer know x with certainty when they
compare different rules.
Proposition 5.2. If Δnp ¼ ðynp; znpÞ is an equilibrium, then (i) znp ¼ x, and (ii) letting Am be the element of A that contains the median
m, then ynpr inf Am.
Proposition 5.2 establishes that the existence of an asymmetry is robust to some forms of incomplete information, in
particular when the manager has some sense about the scope of possible realizations of ~x. The intuition for the result is very
similar to Lemma 3.3 in the baseline model, and to avoid situations in which enough firms expect to disclose and push for
less disclosure, the disclosure threshold must lie in a region wAA that is below the region that contains the median.
(For instance, if the partitions were quintiles, the lower non-disclosure bound would be less than or equal to the 40th
percentile. All managers within a quintile would vote identically, and the votes of the top three quintiles are needed to
sustain a disclosure rule.) The characterization of the equilibrium is also very similar to the baseline model to the extent that
the nondisclosure expected market price is nowmaximized for any possible coarse signal w that the manager may receive.16
5.3. Other remarks
We discuss other extensions of the model; for reasons of space, we provide here only the primary intuitions. Formal
derivations are available from the authors.
Investment decisions: The primary results are unchanged if we extend the model to a productive role of information. We
can extend the previous model by denoting the final cash flow πðx; IÞ where I is a decision made by the new owners of the
firm such that πx40 and the first-best investment InðxÞ ¼ arg maxIπðx; IÞ is a non-constant function of x. Assumption A3 can
then be rephrased by relabeling PðxÞ ¼ πðx; InðxÞÞ and PðΔÞ ¼maxI Eðπð ~x; IÞj ~xAΔÞ which are pricing functions that satisfy the
technical requirements needed for Lemmas 3.1–3.3. In particular, in this extended setting, PðΔÞoEðPð ~xÞj ~xAΔÞ so that there
is some efficiency loss when the information disclosed is too imprecise. As in the baseline model, non-disclosers over-
weight the separation benefits of a higher threshold yn while the cost is shared by all firms, so the model with real effects
implies that the equilibrium rule features more disclosure than the level that would maximize expected market prices.17
Cost structure: In the baseline model, we assume that a reporting cost is incurred by all firms and is not a function of
whether a firm actually makes a disclosure. Because the disclosure rule is, in equilibrium, controlled by non-disclosers, the
predictions are unchanged if there is an incremental cost when making a mandatory disclosure. As an alternative, if the cost
were only paid by disclosers (e.g., an ex-post cost), the equilibrium rule would still be the asymmetric reporting regime that
maximizes the non-disclosure price. If the mean of ~x is greater than its median, we can also show that a mandatory
disclosure threshold above the median would never be an equilibrium. This is because, then, a new rule in which no one
discloses (i.e., no information) yields a non-disclosure price equal to the mean. This new rule will thus be preferred by a
majority composed of (a) all below-median disclosers in the old rule and (b) some disclosers in the old rule whose x is
slightly above-median. For similar reasons, our voluntary disclosure model can accommodate a generalized setting in which
the voluntary disclosure cost cvolðΔÞ is a function of Δ provided we require that, in accordance with assumption A2, a coarser
region Δ implies lower total disclosure costs.
Imperfect enforcement: We have assumed that enforcement is perfect; i.e., firms that are below the threshold do disclose
their information as mandated by the rule, and mandatory disclosures are indeed truthful. In the extreme case, there would
be no purpose in having any mandatory disclosure if firms could ignore the rule (in fact, there is even some well-deserved15 In general, this extension requires the assumption that Δ is an interval. The proof that the equilibrium policy is an interval requires making a change
in the non-disclosure region such that a mass of low-value non-disclosers are reclassified as disclosers and an equal mass of medium-value disclosers are
reclassified as non-disclosers. This transformation is not always possible if the original information sets are very coarse but can always be done if each
information set Ai has equal probability.
16 The details are omitted to save space but are available on request from the authors. In particular, the equilibrium is always unique, and the
conditions for existence are of the same nature as those of the baseline except that they must be stated in terms of the original information sets Ai.
17 In the Appendix, the proof of Lemmas 3.1–3.3 accommodates this extended setting (as we only use the weak requirement that, if the set Δ is shifted
toward more favorable realizations of ~x , the market price should increase). A formal proof that the equilibrium in the model with production features
excessive disclosure is available from the authors on request.
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Christensen et al., 2013). However, intuitions similar to the baseline can be explained with imperfect enforcement. As we
have argued, the measurement is asymmetric because there is a value to pool with higher types of firms. If managers can
incur some private costs to increase their report, coarsening the measurement rule “at the top” would still work to reduce
the earnings management incurred by those who, in a previous measurement rule, had to manage earnings to attain the
target (see also Dye, 2002 for a model of threshold manipulations).
6. Concluding remarks
Corporations that issue securities to the general public are required to produce financial statements that comply with
generally accepted accounting standards, to file special supplementary disclosures with regulatory bodies and to employ an
auditor to issue an opinion in compliance with generally accepted auditing standards. This study develops insights into the
endogenous determination of mandatory disclosure and, in particular, whether a disclosure rule exists that conforms to the
preference of a majority of managers interested in maximizing current market prices. The main finding is that such
mandatory disclosure tends to be asymmetric in two respects: first, it favors disclosure of unfavorable information, and
second, it overweights the private interest of managers with relatively favorable information even when requiring the
disclosure of less favorable information serves no direct productive purpose. These two findings are robust to involvement
by other parties, whether voluntary disclosures are possible and whether post-disclosure (i.e., productive) decisions rely on
public disclosures.
Accounting research has long struggled with understanding policy, often assuming that observed reporting requirements
are either exogenous or the product of a quasi-experimental process whose consequences can be examined in isolation of its
environment. Our approach offers a starting point for a rigorous analysis of the causal determinants of policy. This broader
research agenda can take us closer to an understanding of the institutions that surround accounting policy and, in particular,
answer questions such as why we see commonalities in reporting rules and what frictions can affect the output of the rule-
making process. In doing so, we hope that researchers can achieve a more direct look at the accounting institution that
writes accounting rules rather than only focus on its output.
More research is needed to clarify the causes of regulation and formulate a complete set of testable determinants. As a
byproduct of our focus on reporting concerns, we have left aside open questions about other roles of information which
range from stewardship in the context of conflict of interests between managers and shareholders to other choices such as
capital structure or product market competition. Further, we do not provide here a detailed model of the decision process
within the policy-making bodies, and more reflection will be necessary to understand whether certain institutional
structures might be more effective than others.Acknowledgments
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Appendix A. Omitted proofsProof of Lemma 3.1. Under A1, a disclosure policy Δn must have the form Δn ¼⋃nni ¼ 1ðyni ; zni Þwhere nnZ0. Let us arrange the
intervals fðyni ; zni Þgn
n
i ¼ 1 in a sequence of non-overlapping intervals arranged in a decreasing order. Suppose by contradiction
that the non-disclosure set contains more than a single interval so that yn2ozn2oyn1. For any ϵ40 sufficiently small, there
exists z02ozn2 and y01oyn1 such that ðz02; zn2Þ=2Δ
n, ðy01; yn1Þ=2Δ
n and
Fðzn2ÞFðz02Þ ¼ Fðyn1ÞFðy01Þ ¼ ϵ:
Define Δ0 ¼ ðΔn\½z02; zn2ÞÞ [ ðy01; yn1. By A2, CðΔ
0Þ ¼ CðΔnÞ. Further, ~xj ~xAΔ0 first-order stochastically dominates ~xj ~xAΔn, which
implies that PðΔ0Þ4PðΔnÞ. Therefore, firms with xAK0 ¼Δ0 \ Δn prefer Δ0 and firms with xAX\ðΔ0 [ ΔnÞ weakly prefer Δ0
(strictly if CðΔ0ÞoCðΔnÞ).Therefore, the total mass of firms preferring Δn is bounded from above by 2ϵwhile the total mass of
firms preferring Δ0 is bounded from below by Probð ~xAΔnÞϵ. If ϵ is sufficiently small, Δ0 is collectively preferred to Δn.
Proof of Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3. Let Δn ¼ ðyn; znÞ denote an equilibrium. The proof is decomposed in three steps.
Step 1: We show that Probð ~xAΔnÞZ5. Suppose, by contradiction, that Probð ~xAΔnÞo5. By continuity, there exists Δ0 such
that ΔΔ0 and Probð ~xAΔ0Þo :5. Note that CðΔ0ÞoCðΔnÞ which implies that PðxÞκCðΔ0Þ4PðxÞκCðΔnÞ for any x=2Δ0.
Therefore, strictly more than half of the managers strictly prefer Δ0 over Δn. This is a contradiction to Δn being an
equilibrium.
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From the previous paragraph, FðznþϵÞFðznÞo :5. Define Δ0 ¼Δn [ ½yn; znþϵÞ. For all firms with x=2Δ0:
PðxÞκCðΔ0Þ4PðxÞκCðΔnÞ:
For all firms with xAΔn:
PðΔ0ÞκCðΔ0Þ4PðΔnÞκCðΔnÞ:
Therefore, the mass of firms with strictly higher market price under Δ0 is weakly greater than FðznÞþ1FðznþϵÞ4 :5. This
is a contradiction to Δn being an equilibrium.
Step 3: We show that ynom. Step 1 implies that ynrm;suppose, by contradiction, that yn ¼m. There exist ϵ and u
sufficiently small such that, defining k¼ F 1ð1ϵÞ: (i) FðmÞFðmuÞ41FðkÞ, (ii) PðkÞ4Pððm; xÞÞ, and (iii) Pððmu; kÞÞ4PðmÞ.
Define Δ0 ¼ ðmu; kÞ, then, by (i), CðΔ0ÞoCðΔÞ and, by (ii), all firms with ~xA ðk; x achieve a higher price under Δ0 as disclosers.
Further, by (iii), all firms with ~xAðmu;mÞ achieve a higher price under Δ0 as non-disclosers. It then follows that a mass
FðmÞþ1FðkÞ4 :5 prefers Δ0 over Δn, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. We first show uniqueness. It follows from Lemma 3.3 that a strict majority of all firms are non-
disclosers, therefore the equilibrium must be ynAK  argmaxPððy; xÞÞκCððy; xÞÞ, i.e., the level that maximizes the non-
disclosure price. By continuity, we know that the set K attains its minimum, and let this minimum be denoted k. It is readily
verified that if k0AK\fkg, a policy with the form Δ¼ ðk; xÞ Pareto-dominates a policy with the form ðk0; kÞ.18 Therefore, the
equilibrium is unique and is given by yn ¼min K .
When the solution is interior, it can be characterized by the following first-order condition associated to the above
maximization problem:
∂Eð ~xj ~xZyÞ
∂y y ¼ y
n ¼ κ∂HðFðyÞÞ
∂y y ¼ y
n

ð1FðynÞÞf ðynÞynþ f ðynÞ R xyn f ðxÞx dx
ð1FðynÞÞ2
¼ κf yn H0 F yn  
ynþEð ~xj ~xZynÞ
ð1FðynÞÞ ¼ κH
0 F yn
  
The characterization stated in the Proposition follows immediately.
Next, we show existence of a solution for κ sufficiently large. For a given κ, consider an alternative policy Δ. We know from
Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3 that the policy Δn features the maximal non-disclosure price, so only disclosers under Δ might strictly
prefer Δ over Δn. Define y1 such that 1Fðy1ÞþFðynÞ ¼ 1=2; note that at least 1Fðy1Þ disclosers under Δ that were non-
disclosers under Δn are needed to defeat Δn. Consider the following inequality:
y1κHð1Fðy1ÞÞoPððyn; xÞÞκCððyn; xÞÞ
As κ becomes large, the right-hand side converges to Eð ~xÞ. Since yn must converge to m, the left-hand side must converge to
x and, therefore, this inequality is always satisfied for κ sufficiently large. When this inequality is satisfied, we know that if at
least 1Fðy1Þ non-disclosers are reclassified into disclosers under Δ, all firms with xAðyn; y1Þ achieve a higher market price
under Δn. This is a contradiction to Δ defeating Δn. The corollary follows immediately since an equilibrium must be such that
ynom.
Proof of Corollary 3.2. To show these statements, it is convenient to expand Eq. (1), using an integration by parts
κf yn
 
H0 F yn
  ¼ ð1FðynÞÞf ðynÞyn
ð1FðynÞÞ2

f ðynÞð½xð1FðxÞÞxyn 
R x
yn ð1FðxÞÞ dxÞ
ð1FðynÞÞ2
Z x
yn
ð1FðxÞÞ dx¼ κð1FðynÞÞ2H0ðFðynÞÞ
Suppose next that y2 is a mean-preserving spread of y1. Since the two random variables have the same mean
Z x
x
ð1F1ðxÞÞ dx¼
Z x
x
ð1F2ðxÞÞ dx:18 To see why, note that (i) all non-disclosers under both policies are indifferent, (ii) disclosers under both policies strictly prefer the policy with lower
cost, i.e., with threshold k and (iii) disclosers under k0 and non-disclosers under k, are better-off under k because the threshold k maximizes the gross
market price.
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Z t
x
F1ðxÞ dxr
Z t
x
F2ðxÞ dx:
Therefore, for any t,
Z x
t
ð1F1ðxÞÞ dxr
Z x
t
ð1F2ðxÞÞ dx
Suppose, by contradiction, that F1ðyn1Þ4F2ðyn2Þ. Then
κð1Fðyn1ÞÞ2H0ðF1ðyn1ÞÞZκð1Fðyn2ÞÞ2H0ðF2ðyn2ÞÞ:
It follows that
Z x
yn1
ð1F1ðxÞÞ dxZ
Z x
yn2
ð1F2ðxÞÞ dx:
This, in turn, implies that yn1ryn2. Since F1ðxÞrF2ðxÞ for any xrmaxðm1;m2Þ, it must hold that F1ðyn1ÞrF1ðyn2ÞrF2ðyn2Þ,
a contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 3.3. In the case of ~x Nðm;σ2Þ, it is convenient to define ψ ðXÞ ¼HðΦðλ1ðXÞÞÞ. By substitution, the cost
function Cððy;1ÞÞ can be written as follows:
C y;1ð Þð Þ ¼ψ λ ym
σ
  
:
And, therefore,
P y; xð Þð ÞκC y; xð Þð Þ ¼mþσλ ym
σ
 
κψ λ ym
σ
  
:
Note that A4 is equivalent to ψ ð:Þ convex. The first-order condition is then given by
λ0
ynm
σ
 
κ
σ
λ0
ynm
σ
 
ψ 0 λ
ym
σ
  
¼ 0:
Rearranging this equation
ψ 0 λ
ynm
σ
  
¼ σ
κ
:
The comparative statics follow immediately.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. The proof is identical to Lemma 3.3 given that, if FðγðynnÞÞFðynnÞo :5, a policy of the form
Δ¼ ðynnϵ; xÞ would be preferred by a majority as long as ϵ is sufficiently small.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. For part (i), the only possible equilibrium is Δnn ¼ ðx; xÞ if cvoloc. For part (ii), Lemma 4.1 implies
that the ynnAS and, necessarily, a majority of non-disclosers would always support the policy that maximizes the non-
disclosure price over yAS. For part (iii), note that Δnn ¼ ðynn; xÞ, where ynn is the global maximum of the non-disclosure
market price, must be the equilibrium. Note also that the sufficiency condition can be obtained similar to Proposition 3.1.
Define y1 such that 1Fðy1ÞþFðynnÞ ¼ 1=2. Consider next the following inequality:
y1κCððx; y1ÞÞrPððyn; xÞÞκCððyn; xÞÞ;
where the price now incorporates the truncation due to voluntary disclosures.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. It is immediate that Δs is an equilibrium if αZ :5. Suppose next that αo :5. Assume by
contradiction that Δ¼ ðy; zÞ is an equilibrium with zox. Let ϵ40 be small enough so that ð1αÞð1FðzþϵþFðzÞÞ4 :5, then
Δ0 ¼ ðy; zþϵÞwould be preferred by all firms except possibly by those with xA ðz; zþϵÞÞ. It follows that Δ0 would be preferred
to Δ, a contradiction. Having noted that the equilibrium must have the form Δ¼ ðy; xÞ, there are two cases to consider. First,
assume that y04yn. Then, all informed agents oppose any increase in the threshold above yn while the outside party
supports it. It follows that the equilibrium threshold cannot be increased above yn and Δns ¼ ðyn; xÞ remains the equilibrium.
Second, assume that yn4y0. If ð1αÞð1FðynÞÞ4 :5, non-disclosers can oppose any decrease of the threshold below yn and
Δns ¼ ðyn; xÞ remains the equilibrium. If ð1αÞð1Fðy0ÞÞo :5, disclosers and the outside party have enough political weight to
oppose any increase of the threshold above y0, and Δ
n
s ¼ ðy0; xÞ is the equilibrium. In the intermediate case
ð1αÞð1FðynÞÞo :5o ð1αÞð1Fðy0ÞÞ, the equilibrium threshold must be at the level at which the fraction of non-
disclosers pushing for more disclosure exactly matches the fraction of votes controlled by the outside party, i.e., Δns ¼ ðyns ; xÞ
where ð1αÞð1Fðyns ÞÞ ¼ αþð1αÞFðyns Þ.
Proof of Proposition 5.2. It is immediate that znp ¼ x following the same argument as in the baseline model (if znpox all
managers except, possibly, those observing w where inf w¼ znp would support a small change to znpþϵ). Next, if ynp4sup Am,
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n
pAðinf Am; sup AmÞ, all managers with
sup wr inf Am and all managers withw¼ Am will support Δ¼ ðinf Am; xÞ over Δn. These observations imply that ynpr inf Am.
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